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1. Introduction
Deliberative democrats maintain that a stable 
and desirable democracy can be achieved 
through deliberative reforms in democracy 
(Bohman 1996; Dryzek & Niemeyer 2010). After 
the deliberative turn around 1990, democracy is 
“not just about the making of decisions through 
the aggregation of preferences. Instead, it is also 
about processes of judgment and preference 
formation and transformation within informed, 
respectful, and competent dialogue” (Dryzek & 
Niemeyer 2010, p.3).
However, critics of deliberative democracy 
have argued that deliberation may invite 
political manipulation (Van Mill 1996). William 
Riker (1986, 1988) takes a pessimistic view of 
democracy, claiming that it fails to avoid 
manipulation and cycles of the outcome of 
voting. Based on the literature of social choice 
theory and his own case studies, Riker proposes 
that there are three major forms of political 
manipulation: strategic voting, agenda control, 
and the introduction of new issue dimensions. 
The findings of social choice theory such as 
Arrow’s (1997) and Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s 
(1973; 1975) theorems support Riker’s pessimistic 
conclusions.
The quest ion of whether del iberat ion 
accelerates or prevents political manipulation—
one of the central problems in political theory 
and policy design—remains unanswered. If we 
can solve this problem, then we can judge 
whether or not deliberation actually stabilizes 
democracy. We may even predict whether 
recent deliberative reforms in democracy will 
be successful.
This essay will address Riker’s three types of 
manipulation, which are used to sway voters. 
The essay wil l discuss the benefits and 
drawbacks of deliberative democracy for solving 
the problems posed by the three types of 
manipulation. After reviewing recent research 
on deliberative contributions to the prevention 
of vote manipulation, this essay will argue that 
deliberative solutions for both preference 
structurization and incentive formation are 
indispensable. When these two factors are 
combined, deliberative procedure makes vote 
manipulation substantially difficult.
In section two, the essay will discuss the 
three types of vote manipulation proposed by 
Riker. In section three, as a feasible solution 
to strategic voting, I will argue that the 
deliberative process contributes to generate 
single-peaked preferences and agreement on 
issue dimensions. However, in section four, I will 
argue that structurization of preferences is not 
enough to prevent strategic voting. In section 
five, I will contend that deliberative democrats 
can deter strategic voting by demanding 
deliberative accountability of manipulators. In 
section six, I will discuss deliberative solutions 
to agenda control. In section seven, I will 
argue that the process of deliberation prevents 
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dimension manipulation by sorting out tangled 
issue dimensions into a single dimension 
if preferences and issues are separable . 
Finally, I will conclude that both preference 
structurization and incentive formation through 
deliberative process are indispensable to solve 
the problem of strategic manipulation in voting. 
2. Riker’s three types of manipulation 
William Riker (1988) proposed that there 
are three types of vote manipulation: (1) 
strategic voting, (2) agenda control, and (3) the 
introduction of new issue dimensions. This 
section introduces and briefly explains these 
types of manipulation.
2.1. Strategic voting
Strategic voting is a method of manipulating 
voting results when “some voters can achieve a 
desired outcome by voting contrary to their 
true preferences” (Riker 1988, p.141). Any voters 
can secretly commit strategic voting if the 
discrepancy between their true preferences and 
expressed choices is undetected (Riker 1988). 
Gibbard notes that “any non-dictatorial voting 
scheme with at least three possible outcomes is 
subject to individual manipulation” (Gibbard 
1973, p.587). Here, manipulation refers to 
strategic voting. Thus, Riker concludes that the 
possibility of strategic voting is universal and 
inescapable in any ordinal method of voting, 
voters rank alternatives in accordance with 
their preferences (first, second, third, etc.) (1988, 
p.143).
2.2. Agenda control
Agenda control is a method of manipulation 
which changes the final results by selecting 
alternatives and voters, or by arranging the 
order in which they are presented (Riker 1988). 
Leaders of decision-making bodies can manipulate 
voting through the selection of alternatives, 
voters and voting procedure. Even worse, 
ordinary members can also manipulate voting 
by introducing new alternatives (Riker 1988).
2.3. Introduction of new issue dimensions
By the strategic introduct ion of  new 
dimensions of concern, participants can overturn 
the Condorcet winner, an alternative that gains 
the most support by the process of comparing 
alternatives in pairs (Riker 1986; Riker 1988; 
Hinich & Munger 1997). Under majority rule, a 
median voter can become the Condorcet winner 
if people have single-peaked preferences along 
one dimension of concern (Black 1948; Hinich & 
Munger 1997; Moulin 1980). However, even if 
there exists a Condorcet winner in one 
dimension, the introduction of new dimensions 
breaks the existing Condorcet winner “since 
there is generally no median position when the 
number of issues is greater than one” (Hinich & 
Munger 1997, p.70). Thus, Riker argues that 
such “manipulation is frequent but unidentified, 
again all outcomes of voting are rendered 
meaningless and uninterpretable” (Riker 1988, 
p.238).
3. To avoid strategic voting
Deliberative democrats have sought to 
alleviate issues reflecting Riker’s concerns about 
manipulation. A voting method is said to be 
strategy-proof when, “after careful scrutiny of 
all opportunities, all agents would always 
conclude that their best action is to be truthful” 
(Barberà 2001, p.620). How, though, can the 
process of deliberation make subsequent voting 
strategy-proof?
3.1.  Two reasons why unanimous consensus-
building is unpopular
A solution to the problems of effective 
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consensus-building is that if all participants 
unanimously support the same alternative, by 
definition there is no room for cycles and 
manipulation. Joshua Cohen argues that “ideal 
deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally 
motivated consensus” (Cohen 1997, p.75). Jürgen 
Habermas, a del iberative democrat who 
supports this claim, sees “the principle of 
democracy” as the ideal type of lawmaking in 
modern society, and characterizes it by saying 
“only those statues may claim legitimacy that 
can meet with the assent [Zustimmung] of all 
citizens in a discursive process of legislation 
that in turn has been legally constituted” 
(Habermas 1996, p.110). Habermas values 
unanimous consensus based on the same 
reasons over mere compromise (1996, p.339) 
because reasoned consensus enhances stable 
social coordination. 
A weaker version of unanimous consensus is 
Rawls’ idea of “overlapping consensus” — a 
consensus among people supported by different 
reasons (Rawls 1995) . Rawls argues that 
democratic stability is possible if political 
experts propose desirable alternatives or basic 
laws and then the general public, with diverse 
value standards and comprehensive doctrines, 
support the alternatives for each reason 
endorsed (1995). 
However desirable it may be, assuming 
unanimous consensus in democratic decision-
making is unpopular with a number of theorists 
for two reasons. First, the assumption of 
unanimous consensus may be impractical and 
idealistic in a liberal democratic society where 
people have different value judgments. As 
Cohen notes, “Even under ideal conditions there 
is no promise that consensual reasons will be 
forthcoming. If they are not, then deliberation 
concludes with voting, subject to some form of 
majority rule” (Cohen 1997, p.75). 1 Moreover, 
unanimous consensus is not desirable in those 
cases where preservation of difference enhances 
group rights of minorities (Young 1989) or 
agonistic respect among citizens (Connolly 1991). 
On the other hand, if like-minded people join 
further deliberation, it may generate excessive 
group polarization (Sunstein 2002). Therefore, 
deliberation for unanimous consensus-building is 
uncertain and may be undesirable.
Second, unanimous consensus is mathematically 
unnecessary to have acyclical and strategy-proof 
social decisions (Arrow 1977). For instance, 
Knight and Johnson criticize the unanimous 
consensus approach because the transformation 
of preferences into unanimous consensus is “too 
strong” and “beside the point” in arriving at 
consistent and manipulation-free majority 
decisions (1994, p.283). 
Knight and Johnson argue that a more 
moderate claim is to seek common understanding 
on the issue dimension that people seek to vote 
on while preserving differences over their ideal 
points (1994). They argue that, if people agree on 
dimensions of political controversy such as the 
Left-Right spectrum of political parties, majority 
decision leads determinate results and thus 
solves the problem of cycles and manipulation. 
Therefore, they conclude, although unanimous 
consensus is ideally desirable, it is in reality both 
too strong and unnecessary for the prevention of 
cycles and manipulation.
3.2.  A plausible solution: Consensus on 
issue dimensions and single-peaked 
preferences
Knight and Johnson’s argument is based on 
Duncan Black’s well-known assumption of 
single-peaked preferences of voters. This 
assumption is one of the common ways to obtain 
a Condorcet winner and thus prevent strategic 
manipulation (Arrow 1977; Moulin 1980). An 
intuitive definition of single-peaked preferences 
is that some alternative is not chosen as last by 
all voters (Craven 1991). Such condition is met if 
alternatives can be linearly ordered, according 
to some unanimously agreed criterion such as 
left to right or small to large (along one issue 
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dimension), and each agent have the most 
preferred alternative (e.g., “J”) and his or her 
degree of preference declines monotonically as 
alternatives are farther from the ideal point “J” 
(Barberà 2001; Hinich & Munger 1997). 
The assumption is common because it (1) 
yields a Condorcet winner; (2) preserves all 
desirable conditions of democracy, and (3) is 
most probable to assume that all people have 
single-peaked preferences (Black 1948; Arrow 
1977). 
(1) Importantly, a Condorcet winner exists if 
the preferences of the agents are all single-
peaked along one issue dimension (Dummett & 
Farquharson 1961; Moulin 1980). Here, the 
transformation of preferences into unanimous 
consensus is not a theoretical prerequisite for a 
Condorcet winner, since “single-peakedness 
implies transitivity and hence ensures the 
existence of a Condorcet winner” (Riker 1988, 
p.126). 2 If a Condorcet winner exists, cycles and 
manipulation are not possible. In addition, 
Moulin shows that this unique Condorcet 
winner is the median peak of the individual 
orderings (1988). 3
However, the argument that unanimous 
agreement on issue dimensions is unlikely raises 
legitimate concerns. Still, Niemi proves that a 
Condorcet winner exists if the preferences of 
around 70% of participants are structured along 
the line of one dimension. Niemi concludes that, 
“depending on the size of the group, the paradox 
[non-existence of Condorcet winner] will 
infrequently occur if only 75% or 70% or even 
fewer of the individuals adopt a common 
standard [dimension] of judgment” (1969, p.494). 
Thus, the assumption of single-peakedness 
allows room for people to disagree on issue 
dimensions. The above-mentioned research 
suggests that if the assumption of single-peaked 
preferences holds, majority decision rules yield 
a Condorcet winner and avoid manipulation 
even given modest disagreement and a plurality 
of values in society.
(2) Moreover, the assumption is common 
because it preserves all fundamental conditions 
of democracy, as proposed by Arrow and 
Gibbard-Satterthwaite. In order to avoid the 
Condorcet paradox and strategic manipulation, 
one has to relax one of the democratic conditions. 
However, under single-peakedness assumption, 
one can avoid cycles and manipulation without 
relaxation of democratic conditions, since given 
preferences of individuals ensures acyclicity in 
social preference.
Indeed, the assumption of single-peaked 
preferences is one kind of possible value 
restriction that ensures acyclicity in social 
preferences (Sen & Pattanaik 1969; Arrow 1977; 
Craven 1991). Yet, such an assumption “is a 
constraint on the structure of preference 
orderings, not on the content of preferences” 
(Knight & Johnson 1994, p.282). This is the 
theoretical advantage of the single-peaked 
preference assumption—it does not require the 
relaxation of unrestricted domain conditions to 
avoid cycles and manipulation while preserving 
a plurality of opinion. 
(3) In addition, this assumption is most probable 
because people tend to prefer alternatives that 
are closer to their most preferred alternatives. 
Single-peakedness of preferences derives from 
the tendencies of rational agents. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that people’s preference 
distribution exhibits single-peakedness when the 
issue dimension is single and alternatives are 
linearly ordered.
To sum up, the assumption of single-peaked 
preferences avoids cycles and manipulation 
without relying on a complex transformation 
mechanism of preferences and unanimous 
consensus on alternatives. The research suggests 
that the assumption of single-peakedness is 
robust enough to answer charges of strategic 
manipulation and is suitable for society with 
plural values and modest disagreement.    
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3.3.  Agreement on issue dimensions and 
tentative triumph of deliberative 
democrats
Single-peaked preferences require shared 
adoption of issue dimensions among people. 
Various factors contribute to form this common 
adoption of issue dimensions. Niemi argues that, 
within the “two-party system, . . . socialization 
processes, discussion and other forms of 
interaction often structure the situation by 
formulating or clarifying the principal issue 
involved in a dispute” (1969, p.494). Since the 
deliberative turn, researchers have often argued 
that deliberation helps us obtain single-peaked 
preferences by forming agreement about issue 
dimensions (Miller 1992; Knight & Johnson 1994; 
Dryzek & List 2003; Mackie 2003).
Dryzek and List describe how the deliberative 
processes that request generalizable interest, 
reasons that are acceptable to all, induce single-
peaked preferences on a shared dimension (2003). 
Their argument can be summarized as follows. 
First, reflective and social aspects of deliberation 
encourage people to “re-frame” a given decision 
problem in terms of generalizable interests 
(Dryzek & List 2003, p.16). This process helps 
people to discover, create, and identify relevant 
issue dimensions (e.g., open/closed, equality/
inequality) (Dryzek & List 2003). Deliberation 
also disaggregates a profile of each agent into 
separate dimension-specific profiles (Dryzek 
& List 2003). Second, “the informational . . . and 
argumentative . . . aspects of deliberation resolve 
factual disagreements on how alternatives 
are aligned on the shared dimension” (Dryzek 
& List 2003, p.16). Finally, people’s rationality 
allows them to find their ideal points and form 
single-peaked preferences on the single issue 
dimension (Dryzek & List 2003).
Since generalizable values and interest are 
agreeable or at least understandable for many 
people, people’s concerns are connected to 
widely shared issue dimensions. 4 Thus, many 
people would agree about which lines of issue 
they contest (agreement on issue dimensions). 
However, this agreement is not a substantive 
agreement, but a meta-level agreement (Dryzek 
& List 2003). Niemi’s research (1969), mentioned 
above, suggests that it is sufficient if 70% or 
fewer people agree. With such meta-level 
agreement ,  there is st i l l  wide room for 
disagreement. 5 Therefore, it is more plausible to 
assume that people can reach agreement on 
issue dimensions than unanimous consensus on 
substantive conclusion.
If people agree on an issue’s dimension, then 
the rational agent would place his or her ideal 
point on the spectrum of the shared issue 
dimension. Eventually, single-peaked preferences 
on the issue dimension are formed among 
people. List and Pettit argue that “deliberation 
may transform individual attitudes so as to 
make them more cohesive and bring about a 
pattern like unidimensional alignment” (2011, 
p.52). If this is the case, one can avoid cycles 
and manipulation. Therefore, as Knight and 
Johnson conclude, the instability of democracy 
caused by cycles is not “quite so dire a threat to 
democracy as Riker supposes” (1994, p. 280).
Riker acknowledges that “agreement about 
dimensions probably renders uncontrived 
cyclical outcomes quite rare” (1988, p.128). 
After citing Peter Fishburn’s analysis of 
the transitivity of collective decision, Riker 
admits that “quite a wide variety of rather 
mild agreement about the issue dimension 
guarantees a Condorcet winner” (1988, p.128). 
Hence, he concludes that, “because of agreement 
on an issue dimension, intransitivity only 
occasionally renders decisions by majoritarian 
methods meaningless, at least for somewhat 
homogeneous groups and at least when 




4. In support of Riker’s concerns
It is attractive to adopt the assumption of 
single-peaked preferences and meta-level 
agreement on the single issue dimension 
through public deliberation. Nevertheless, Riker 
(1998) argues that such a solution to the problem 
of strategic manipulation will only work in the 
case of minor political issues. He explains that, if 
issues “are politically important enough to 
justify the energy and expense of contriving 
cycles,” manipulators have incentive for 
manipulation whenever possible (1988, p.128). 
Thus, Riker holds that, “on the very most 
important subjects, cycles may render social 
outcomes meaningless” (1988, p.128).
Riker’s concern about the ineradicability of 
strategic voting is legitimate for three reasons: 
(1) Vote trading (logrolling) allows manipulation 
even when there exists a unique Condorcet 
winner (Riker 1988); (2) the incentive for 
strategic voting survives even under value 
restriction, including single-peaked preferences, 
in special situations (Craven 1991); and (3) if 
political issues are not separable into a set of 
s ingle dimensions, then Chaos Theorem 
suggests that multi-dimensional political issue 
opens the unlimited possibilities of strategic 
manipulations (Riker 1988).
4.1.  Vote trading as a dynamic system of 
strategic voting
Riker argues that vote trading dramatically 
accelerates the likelihood of strategic voting 
even in the presence of a unique Condorcet 
winner (1988, p.157). Even when single-peaked 
preferences are formed through deliberation, 
manipulators still obtain intended outcomes by 
vote trading (logrolling) or coordinating strategic 
voting with other participants who are bribed 
with future benefits or support on other 
occasions of voting. Vote trading is especially 
frequent when the collective decision-making is 
repeated and serial: in legislatures, committees, 
and local community meetings, for instance. 6 
This concern may not be relevant to a voting 
body that is randomly sampled from the public, 
such as the members of a public jury and 
Deliberative Poll, small group discussion among 
randomly selected members of citizen.
The dissatisfaction of the losers can also 
accelerate the dynamics of vote trading. 
According to Riker, an absolute majority of 
first-place votes minimizes the number of 
dissatisfied persons (Riker 1988). However, 
Riker suggests that, “Even in equilibrium, 
substantial though minority dissatisfaction is to 
be expected” (Riker 1988, p.207). For instance, 
having a Condorcet winner effectively reduces 
the number of dissatisfied persons. Yet, a 
Condorcet winner makes individuals who do 
not get their first choice make a social decision. 
In such a case, Riker argues, “the various 
members of the majority of dissatisfied losers . . . 
have a compelling motive to upset the current 
outcome” (Riker 1988, p.208). Thus, even if a 
Condorcet winner is given, people may have 
an incentive to manipulate a vote. Therefore, 
vote trading may undermine the equilibrium of 
collective decision-making, which is formed by 
structured preferences through deliberation.
4.2.  Manipulability with restricted preferences
Single-peaked preferences ensure the 
acyclicity of social preferences and strategy-
proofness. However, Craven (1991) shows that, 
in some cases, strategic voting occurs even 
under value restrictions such as single-peaked 
preferences. According to Craven, group 
members have an incentive to express false 
preferences when certain groups can improve 
their welfare and have a sufficient number of 
members to overturn the existing Condorcet 
winner (1991). They would conceal their sincere 
single-peaked preferences and express false 
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intransitive preferences so that they yield cycles 
and indeterminacies of result, which would allow 
further manipulation.
Craven provides the following example 
(Craven 1991, p.97): 
　　　
Table 1. Potentially manipulable single-peaked 











From preferences with a single-peaked 
structure shown above, alternative b is chosen 
in the following cases: 
If n2 + n3 + n4 > n1, then bPa gets the most 
votes and alternative b is chosen.
If n1 + n2 + n3 > n4, then bPc gets the most 
votes and alternative b is chosen.
If alternative b is chosen, then groups E and 
H are not absolutely better off, since their first 
choices (a and c) are not chosen. If groups E and 
H express false preferences by putting b last, 
then they can get their most-preferred 
consequences or yield cycles, which allows 
further manipulation. Thus, groups E and H 
have an incentive to express false preferences.
Such cases depend largely on contingent 
factors: the number of each faction, the chosen 
Condorcet winner, and the preference patterns 
of factions. Yet, Niemi’s research (1969) implies 
that if more than 25% of people’s preferences 
violate the single-peaked pattern, they also 
increase the possibility of cycles and thus of 
strategic manipulation. These examples show 
that single-peaked preferences cannot guarantee 
the elimination of the possibility of strategic 
voting in some special cases. 
4.3. Separability of preferences and issues
Riker refers to McKelvey and Schofield’s 
Chaos Theorem and conclude that democracy 
results in disequilibrium if a decision is made on 
multidimensional issues (1988). The Chaos 
Theorem asserts that, “regardless of other 
voters’ preferences, any one voter with complete 
information about the other voters’ preferences, 
control of the agenda, and the ability to cast his 
own vote as he chooses can always construct 
majority paths to get anywhere in the [policy] 
space” (McKelvey 1979).
In order to avoid such multidimensional chaos, 
deliberative democrats argue that deliberation 
can “sort out, and hopefully reduce, the 
dimension over which they disagree” (Knight & 
Johnson 1994, p.282). However, the problem is 
not as simple as deliberative democrats 
maintain. Hinich and Munger describe the 
nature of this problem as follows: “Voting on 
each issue separately can solve the problem of 
multidimensional instability of majority rule. 
However, separating the issues in the agenda 
works only if preferences are also separable” 
(1997, p .166) .  Riker argues that “survey 
researchers repeatedly find that voters appear 
to judge candidates and issues by one or more 
dimensions of concern” (1988, p.182). He explains: 
Continuity in a world of several dimensions 
is of utmost importance for strategic 
manipulation. It is this feature that allows 
for the easy multiplication of alternatives, 
that generates a wide variety of individual 
orderings ,  and that thereby creates 
situations of disequilibrium in which the 
chance of the existence of a Condorcet 
winner is reduced to practically zero. (Riker 
1988, p.182)
Thus, as Riker concludes, “in the absence of 
an equilibrium, anything can happen” (1988, 
p.187).
However, Mackie refutes this argument. He 
argues that the Chaos Theorem depends on 
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unrealistic premises (2003, p.175). According to 
Mackie, “the multidimensional disequilibrium 
version of spatial theory does not, so far, survive 
experimental testing” (2003, p .181) .  The 
assumption “that the distribution of preferences 
is multidimensional rather than unidimensional 
is not established” (Mackie 2003, p.181). Mackie 
asserts that the Condorcet winner and 
equilibrium exist regardless of the separability 
of preferences. He argues that: 
If preferences are separable, and if voters 
are either sincere or strategic , then 
dimension by dimension voting will select 
the  in tersect ion  o f  med ians  as  the 
equilibrium choice. If preferences are 
nonseparable, then dimension by dimension 
vot ing  wi l l  necessar i ly  se l ec t  tha t 
equilibrium, unless voters are sophisticated 
(Mackie 2003, p.177).
Mackie concludes that , “dimension-by-
dimension voting is an exemplar of structure-
induced equilibrium . . . to force stability upon 
chaos” (2003, p.178). If Mackie is correct, 
then dimension-by-dimension voting yields 
equilibrium, even in multidimensional issue 
spaces, by reducing a multidimensional choice to 
“an unrelated series of unidimensional choices” 
(Hinich & Munger 1997, p.166). Researchers seek 
strategy-proof conditions in multidimensional 
cases (Moulin 1980; Barberà 2001). However, 
the question has not been fully settled and 
it deserves further formal and empirical 
investigation. 
To summarize, researchers have argued for 
the introduction of the assumption of single-
peaked preferences and agreement on issue 
dimensions through deliberation as a viable 
solution to the problem of strategic voting 
in a liberal democratic society. However, the 
possibility of vote trading, manipulability 
under value restriction, and the problem of 
multidimensional chaos suggest that deliberative 
effects on the structurization of preferences 
such as single-peaked preferences are not 
sufficient to avoid strategic voting in some 
cases. This leads us to regard the importance of 
the incentive formation of participants through 
the deliberative process, discussed in the next 
section.
5. Incentive-formation through 
deliberation as another solution  
to the problem of strategic voting
In the previous section, I showed that 
strategic voting is still possible even under 
structured preferences such as single-peaked 
preferences. Deliberative democrats can address 
such drawbacks by offering other solutions. 
They argue that deliberation deters the 
incentive for strategic voting because it 
increases (1) the equal distribution of information 
about people’s preference orderings, (2) the cost 
of manipulation and (3) non-self-centered 
incentives. All of these factors make strategic 
manipulation difficult.
5.1.  Equal distribution of information about 
people’s preference orderings
Deliberation may reveal the preference 
orderings of participants. This may enhance 
strategy-proofness in voting, despite the fact 
that perfect information is an important factor in 
strategic voting and other kinds of manipulation.
Deliberative democracy asks participants to 
give reasons for their choices. This increases 
the likelihood that people will reveal their 
preference orderings. This may be true, 
especially in repetitive or face-to-face small 
group deliberations. Yet, critics of deliberative 
democrats worry that deliberation itself may 
increase the potential for manipulation, because 
perfect information about people’s preferences is 
the major source of strategic manipulation (Van 
Mill 1996). As Mackie says, “The manipulator 
needs confident knowledge of the distribution 
of preference rankings in the population” 
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(2003, p.160). Thus, according to Van Mill, “too 
much information distributed to all members 
about the other participants’ beliefs is more 
democratic, but can make it easier to manipulate 
the agenda” (1996, p.749). Similarly, information 
about the others’ beliefs is indispensable for 
strategic voting and dimension manipulation.
However, Van Mill’s concern is not legitimate. 
Given information about the preference 
orderings of all participants, other participants 
can detect traits of manipulation and then 
counter manipulation by strategic voting. A 
disproportionate distribution of information 
may help manipulators, but commonly shared 
information does not, because it prevents the 
manipulator from gaining an informational 
advantage. In short, deliberation enhances the 
distribution of information about participants’ 
preference orderings. This increases the 
likelihood of detecting secret manipulations 
and counter threats against manipulators, 
and thus weakens the incentive for strategic 
manipulation.
5.1.1.  Dispute on observation of preferences: 
Riker versus Mackie
Riker argues that “to identify strategic 
voting requires that we know both the voter’s 
true values and the voter’s actual expression 
of the value in a vote” (1988, p.167). However, 
he argues, “from direct observation we can 
know only the latter. We must infer the former 
from other and softer evidence” (Riker 1988, 
p.167). Mackie asserts that Riker assumes 
that manipulation is unknowable, and that the 
prospect of manipulation therefore exists in 
every voting scenario (Mackie 2003, p.38). This 
leads Riker to the unsustainable conclusion 
that the possibility of manipulation necessarily 
exists in every voting scenario. Mackie criticizes 
Riker’s argument because, he says, it contains 
a paradox: “Manipulation is possible only if 
preferences are known; but if manipulation 
is possible, then preferences are unknown” 
(2003, p.160). The crux of Riker’s argument is 
that he insists that manipulation is ubiquitous 
precisely because of our inability to observe 
these manipulations and assess either their 
frequency or level of severity. Mackie argues that 
“manipulation is not possible, however, without 
knowledge of others’ preferences” (2003, p.160). 
Therefore, Mackie refutes Riker’s argument by 
proposing that voters’ “underlying preferences 
are knowable,” and this would lead us to 
conclude that manipulation is, in fact, assessable 
(2003, p.39). 
Mackie’s argument seems plausible because 
Riker’s argument does seem to contain the 
paradox Mackie says it does. Moreover, Riker’s 
assumption is derived from aggregative account 
of democracy, which overlooks the effect of 
deliberation before voting. Since the deliberation 
process encourages communication among 
people and their being accountable for their 
opinion, it can enhance the distribution of 
information about people’s preference orderings. 
If manipulation is knowable by others, then 
manipulation is crippled and democracy is free 
from strategic voting.
5.2.  Credible threat increases cost of 
manipulation
If proof of manipulation is revealed to public, 
then people can counter manipulators. If the 
cost of manipulation is high, manipulators would 
withdraw actual manipulation even if they 
potentially have incentive to do so. Hence, 
credible counter threats would deter strategic 
incentive of manipulators (Kelly 1993).
Riker himself admits that the majority can 
counter a manipulator’s strategic voting by 
likewise committing strategic voting and 
forming a coalition (Riker 1988). In such cases, 
strategic voting may cancel each other out. 
When this occurs, strategic voting does not 
actually lead to a harmful outcome (Mackie 
2003).
In repeated deliberation settings such as a 
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legislature or a committee, tit-for-tat strategies 
would work. Moreover, even in one-off settings, 
“if all voters vote strategically, . . . then the 
outcome is just the same as if all voters vote 
sincerely . . . , sophisticated votes cancel each 
other out in a manner of speaking, and our 
true and fair outcome is thus restored” (Mackie 
2003, p.161). Indeed, the expectation to vote 
strategically is enough to deter strategic 
incentive (Mackie 2003, p.161). Austen-Smith 
(1987) shows that sincere voting and strategic 
voting generate identical results under the 
full knowledge of others’ preferences and the 
freedom of offering amendments.
5.3.  Preference filtering for public debate 
avoids self-centered incentive
Not only counter threats but also personal 
reputation in the public forum serves as an 
obstac le  to  manipulat ion .  In repet i t ive 
deliberative settings, false representations of 
preferences become a risk in that, “nobody will 
believe you next time” if one’s deception comes 
to light (Dryzek & List 2003, p.10). In the long 
run, people avoid damaging their personal 
reputation as it would damage their ability to 
persuade others. To Habermas, participants in 
deliberation must maintain their truthfulness in 
order that their claims to be perceived as valid. 
Therefore, deliberative democrats argue that 
requirements of accountability or reason-giving 
in public discourse induce non-self-centered 
incentive (Goodin 1986). 
Indeed, influential deliberative democrats such 
as Jürgen Habermas argue that understanding 
among people is achieved when the listener 
accepts the “validity” of the claims made by 
the speaker (1996). Validity is composed of 
three criteria: rightness, truth and truthfulness 
(Habermas 1986). Rightness is affirmed in 
relation to norms and normative contexts. Truth 
is stated for correct existential presuppositions. 
Truthfulness is claimed based on the expression 
of subjective experience. Thus, Habermas argues 
that, “an agreement of this sort is achieved 
simultaneously at three levels” (1986, p.307).
This threefold validity check may deter the 
incentive of strategic manipulation. For the 
manipulator, a truthfulness check seems to be 
the most difficult to achieve because maintaining 
consistency between speech and actions is 
difficult. As Habermas notes, “Addressees who 
have accepted a claim to sincerity can expect a 
consistency of behavior in certain respects” 
(Habermas 1986, p.303). If the manipulator has to 
obey this deliberative accountability, then he or 
she cannot achieve the hidden intentions 
because they cannot be openly implemented. 
Habermas argues that even “concealing publicly 
indefensible interests behind pretended moral 
or ethical reasons necessitates self-bindings that 
either on the next occasion expose a proponent 
as inconsistent or, in the interest of maintaining 
his credibility, lead to the inclusion of others’ 
interests” (Habermas 1996, p.340). Thus, the 
manipulator is discouraged from venturing 
strategic action in communicative action. 
If this is the case, “the structural constraints 
of an intersubjectively shared language impel 
the actors ‒ in sense of weak transcendental 
necessity ‒ to step out of the egocentricity of a 
purposive rational orientation toward their own 
respective success and to surrender themselves 
to the publ ic criteria of communicative 
rationality” (Habermas 1998, p.233). Habermas 
explains that the requirement of validity plays 
as a filter, which “screen [s] the topics and 
contributions, information and reasons in such a 
way that, ideally, only the ‘valid’ inputs pass 
through the filter of fair bargaining and rational 
discourses” (1996, p.341).
In line with Habermas, if one takes the 
theoretical standpoint that people are not only 
motivated by private interests but also by 
publ ic  ones ,  then Goodin ’s  proposa l  on 
“laundering preference” becomes an attractive 
solution to strategic manipulation (Goodin 1986). 
Goodin argues that, “in the context of collective 
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decision-making, people will launder their own 
preferences. They will express only their public-
oriented, ethical preferences, while suppressing 
their private-oriented, egoistic ones” (Goodin 
1986, p.88). Laundering preferences also means 
that social authorities respond selectively to 
people’s preferences so that undesirable 
preferences are not represented (Goodin 1986). 
Under such considerat ions ,  people may 
undertake an internal deliberative reflection 
called “deliberation within” (Goodin 2003, p.183). 
Consequently, people act qua good citizens apart 
from personal cost and benefit concerns. 
Therefore, deliberative democrats argue that 
the deliberative requirement to keep one’s 
truthfulness may deter strategic incentive of 
manipulation.
We can see that the deliberation process 
deters the incentive of strategic voting because 
it enhances equal distribution of information 
about people’s preference orderings, cost of 
manipulation, and non-self-centered incentive. 
The combination of all of these factors makes 
strategic voting substantively difficult.
To summarize, deliberative responses to 
strategic voting consist of two major solutions: 
establishing agreement on issue dimensions for 
single-peaked preferences and preventing 
incentives for strategic vot ing through 
deliberation. However, the structurization of 
preferences, commonly acknowledged as the 
solution for strategic voting, is not enough. Both 
the structurization of preferences and the 
formation of incentive through deliberative 
process are indispensable for the prevention of 
strategic voting.
6. To avoid agenda control
Incentive formation through deliberation 
reduces another kind of manipulation: agenda 
control. Agenda control is prevented if a strong 
equilibrium such as a Condorcet winner exists. 
Riker argues that, “if voters have enough 
information to know that such an outcome could 
be arrived at, then it is probably difficult to 
manipulate an agenda” (1988, p.170) . For 
example, if all voters know alternative X wins 
the majority, the proposal of a new alternative 
or a new procedure by leaders is regarded as 
illegitimate by other participants. Thus, a strong 
equilibrium of people’s opinion may inhibit 
agenda control. Yet, Riker claims that, “since the 
conditions for a strong equilibrium are difficult 
to fulfill, manipulation of the agenda is not 
usually precluded because of the distortion of 
tastes” (1988, p.171). Riker refers to McKelvey 
and Schofield’s Chaos Theorem regarding “the 
extraordinary fragility of equilibria” when a 
political issue involve two or more dimensions 
(Riker 1988, p.192). Chaos Theorem shows that a 
multidimensional decision potentially opens the 
endless possibilities of agenda control.
6.1.  Democratic solutions against agenda 
control
As solutions to agenda control, deliberative 
democrats offer (1) a democratic filtering of 
voting procedure, (2) new proposals through the 
requirement of democratic accountability and (3) 
information-sharing mechanisms which enable 
counter-threats against agenda control by 
strategic voting. Accordingly, deliberation may 
avoid agenda control through incentive 
formation even within multidimensional cases.
In democratic settings, agenda control has to 
be approved by other participants. Even leaders 
of a voting body are constrained by procedural 
regulation and approval of ordinary participants 
(Riker 1988). Moreover, apparent agenda control 
can be challenged by other participants in 
democratic decision-making bodies (Riker 1988).
Riker claims that, “despite these restrictions, 
however, leaders’ control of agenda is ordinarily 
not challenged,” since leaders are customarily 
regarded as legitimate and satisfy the regulation 
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of fairness in voting bodies (1988, p.170). Leaders 
are typically not challenged except in cases of 
extreme arbitrariness because challenging 
agenda control signifies challenging leadership 
itself; thus, it is costly (Riker 1988). This implies 
that there exists wide room for unchallenged 
agenda control. 
Still, deliberative democrats do challenge 
Riker’s assumption. Under deliberative settings, 
both leaders and participants have to justify 
their proposals publicly. For leaders, the 
challenge and threat of reelection from other 
participants would deter the incentive of agenda 
control . Although settled issues such as 
leadership draw few challenges while political 
issues are contentious, under deliberative 
democracy, authority in politics becomes “a 
limited suspension of judgment enabled by a 
context of democratic challenge and public 
accountability” (Warren 1996, p.46). While Riker 
does not investigate enough whether proposals 
from ordinary participants will be challenged, it 
is highly plausible to think that ordinary 
participants who attempt to influence agenda 
control unduly will likewise be challenged by 
other participants. Accordingly, by deliberative 
accountability and counter threat, deliberative 
democrats can offer solutions to agenda control 
as discussed below.
6.1.1.  Democratic filtering of voting procedure
Deliberation directly deters the attempt of 
agenda manipulat ion such as arbitrary 
procedures, restriction of alternatives and the 
introduction of new voters. Deliberative 
democracy potentially asks all participants 
justify their claims and situations by publicly 
giving reasons. Thus, deliberation would 
dramatically accelerate the probability of being 
challenged about agenda control, since the 
deliberative forum is equally open to anyone 
with equal participatory power, even including 
non-participants (Cohen 1986). Sunstein mentions 
that, “in deliberative politics, even the most 
vernal or self-interested participants in politics 
must invoke public justifications in their 
support” (1993, p.244). Thus, if deliberative 
democracy does not let a procedural matter go 
unchallenged, agenda manipulation becomes 
substantially more difficult.
6.1.2.  Democratic filtering of new proposals
Deliberation also deters more a subtle attempt 
of agenda manipulation: the introduction of new 
alternatives. Deliberative democracy requires 
equal proposal and participatory power to all 
(Cohen 1986). Thus, equal participatory power 
accelerates the chance of agenda control by 
means of introducing new alternatives.
Deliberative democrats respond to this 
problem by explaining that “deliberation can be 
used to decide on a procedure for distinguishing 
between relevant and irrelevant alternatives” 
(Dryzek & List 2003, p.23). 7 In a deliberative 
democracy, manipulators have to justify their 
proposals; thus, irrelevant alternatives would be 
rejected (Dryzek & List 2003). However, as it is 
difficult to distinguish desirable proposals from 
strategic proposals, it is also unlikely that 
manipulators commit strategic manipulations, 
since manipulators have to be accountable for 
giving reasons about their proposals and choices 
not only at the moment of discourse but also 
after the discourse (Habermas 1996). Basically, 
manipulators have to keep deceiving others for 
long time. This laborious task would weaken the 
incentive for strategic manipulation.
6.1.3.  Information-sharing mechanisms 
and counter-threats by strategic 
voting
Deliberation enhances information sharing 
about others’ preference orderings and the 
possibilities of counter-threats by strategic 
voting. Agenda control is countered by 
strategic voting: “‘Manipulation’ [i.e., strategic 
voting] may be the mechanism that gives 
voters countervailing power over agenda 
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setters” (Hinich & Munger 1997, p.166). If other 
participants know the influence of an agenda 
setter on voting results, other participants can 
vote against agenda control by strategic voting 
(Hinich & Munger 1997). Moreover, shared 
information about preference orderings of 
participants helps people detect traits of agenda 
control and fight against it. 
We have seen that deliberation process 
functions as a democratic filtering mechanism 
aga inst  agenda contro l .  By request ing 
justification and accountability, deliberative 
procedure inhibits such agenda controls as 
arbitrary procedure, restriction of alternatives 
and the introduction of new voters. Deliberation 
successfully deters incentives for manipulation 
even in subtle cases like the introduction of new 
alternatives. Moreover, the information-sharing 
function of deliberation helps people fight 
against agenda control through counter-strategic 
voting. These f indings suggest that the 
incentive formation and information-sharing 
functions of deliberative democracy play 
significant role in preventing agenda control.
7. To avoid dimension manipulation
Collective decisions are susceptible to 
manipulation when they contain more than one 
issue dimension. The more issue dimensions 
are attached to the decision, the more difficult 
it is to gain an alternative to satisfy the 
n-dimensional median of all issue dimensions. 
Hence, deliberation and open discussion 
may have controversial effects on dimension 
manipulation.
7.1.  Open discussion and multidimensional 
chaos
Niemi warns that new issues and ad hoc 
groups contribute to unstructured situations 
leading to cycles and manipulation, since 
“Intransitivities are most likely to occur in 
unstructured situations, where there are no 
common guidelines for judging the alternatives 
or in situations involving multiple dimensions” 
(Niemi 1969, p.494). Here, manipulators exploit 
unstructured situations by manipulating issue 
dimensions.
The problem of multidimensional issues may 
occur more often in the wildness of the general 
public sphere rather than in that of arranged 
publics (Habermas 1996). This applies not only 
to skillful politicians who exercise heresthetic 
(Riker 1986) but also to ordinary participants 
and all citizens who can/should introduce new 
dimensions to public decision making, since 
openness is an crucial function of deliberative 
democracy (Habermas 1996). However, this 
desirable feature of open democracy may render 
collective decisions highly manipulable. By the 
strategic introduction of new issue dimensions, 
participants can break the existing median and 
change results of collective decision to their 
desirable consequences. Therefore, Riker 
concludes that, “manipulation is almost always 
possible” and the equilibrium of democracy is 
destabilized (1988, p.141).
7.2.  Bridging rhetoric and multidimensional 
chaos
Dryzek’s recent argument about “bridging 
rhetoric” is a good example of deliberation-led 
multidimensional chaos. According to Dryzek 
and Niemeyer (2010), “bridging rhetoric” is a 
type of rhetoric which appeals to a wide range 
of people who have different socioeconomic 
backgrounds by selectively invoking their 
interests and concerns. Thus, bridging rhetoric 
helps “securing wide public attention” (Dryzek 
& Niemeyer 2010, p.74). Dryzek and Niemeyer 
suggest that not only reason but also “non-logos 
aspects” such as rhetoric play important role in 




Dryzek and Niemeyer (2010) raise the concern 
about distinguishing between good and bad 
rhetoric in support of rhetorical communication 
in deliberation. They differentiate “bonding” and 
“bridging” rhetoric for this reason: “Bonding is 
associating with people who are similar in social 
background, bridging is associating with people 
with different social characteristics” (Dryzek & 
Niemeyer 2010, p.76). They conclude that, “tests 
are necessary to distinguish between desirable 
and undesirable rhetorical invocation and 
suppression of particular discourses” (Dryzek & 
Niemeyer 2010, p.67). 
However, the problem of bridging rhetoric 
involves the absence of a Condorcet winner 
and manipulability, although Dryzek and 
Niemeyer pay little attention to this. If bridging 
rhetoric amalgamates different expectations 
and concerns, it makes it difficult to have a 
Condorcet winner and strategy-proof voting 
results. Fundamentally, different dimensions 
of  issues brought by people accelerate 
multidimensional chaos and prevent single-
peaked preferences.
Although the idea of bridging rhetoric works 
well for the inclusion of diverse participants, it 
does not work well for yielding the Condorcet 
winner and avoiding strategic manipulation. 
Therefore, further deliberation processes for 
agreeing on issue dimensions and deliberative 
accountability are indispensable after invoking 
wide public awareness of issues by bridging 
rhetoric.
7.3.  Sorting issue dimensions through 
deliberation
When multiple issues are packaged together 
such that they appear to be single issue, 
proposed issue dimension and issue dimension 
in people’s mind do not match, and even 
reasonable people have preferences with more 
than one peak along single issue dimension 
(Dryzek & List 2003). In order to avoid such 
complications, it is important to sort out 
entangled issue dimensions into separate issue 
dimensions (Miller 1992). 
The deliberative process is expected to 
prevent situations in which multiple dimensions 
and multiple peaks are mixed up. Thus, by 
distinguishing and sorting complex problems 
into each single issue dimension, people can 
achieve a collective decision by voting; in other 
words, to “induce a shared understanding 
regarding the dimensions of conflict” (Knight & 
Johnson 1994, p.282). If relevant voters “can 
agree about what is at stake in a particular 
political conflict ‒ majority rule need not 
generate cyclical social orderings” (Knight & 
Johnson 1994, p.282). Therefore, the deliberative 
process is a prerequisite for dimension-by-
dimension voting, which presents cycles and 
manipulation.
According to Dryzek and List (2003), the 
deliberative process addresses the problem of 
multidimension in four ways: subdividing 
decision problems into dimension-specific sub-
dimensions, making hierarchies of dimensions 
for decision procedure, revealing agents’ 
subjective priority on issue-dimensions by vote 
trading or logrolling, and proposing more 
appropriate alternatives (Dryzek & List 2003). 
Empirical data from Deliberative Poll show that, 
“ordinal rankings of policy options approach 
single-peakedness” after deliberation (Farrar et 
al. 2010, p.333), an effect, as Fishkin argues, 
significant for those who have not formed their 
opinion (2009). In short, the deliberative process 
contributes to division and sorting of issue 
dimensions and agreement on the issue that 
most concern people.
To sum up, dimension manipulation is 
common in real politics. However, deliberation 
may prevent dimension manipulation if it 
sorts out dimensions via open discussion. 
Consequently, openness is a fundamental 
feature of deliberative democracy. Yet, given 
this openness and participation, everyone 
can add new interpretations or dimensions of 
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issues, potentially causing multidimensional 
chaos. Dryzek and Niemeyer argument on 
bridging rhetoric, for instance, may make 
political issues multidimensional by packing 
different perspectives into one catch-all political 
issue. Hence, open deliberation needs further 
deliberation to sort mixed dimensions. Therefore, 
stable and desirable democracy needs not 
only deliberation for openness and inclusion of 
various opinions, but also deliberation for sorting 
issue dimensions. Then, dimension-by-dimension 
voting procedures, with agreement on issue 
dimensions and single-peaked preferences, can 
avoid cycles and strategic manipulation.
8. Conclusion
Deliberative democrats maintain that the 
deliberative process helps us avoid the problem 
of vote manipulation described by Riker. First, 
deliberation enhances the structurization of 
preferences such as single-peaked preferences 
by inducing agreement on issue dimensions. 
Thus, deliberation helps to yield a Condorcet 
winner and makes the voting process strategy-
proof. However, this is not sufficient to preclude 
the possibility of manipulation. Therefore, the 
second solution requires deterring incentives for 
manipulation through deliberative accountability 
requirements. If these two solutions are 
combined, deliberative democrats successfully 
refute from Riker’s criticisms of political 
manipulation in democracy.
Manipulation cannot be a serious problem as 
long as the possibility of strategic manipulation 
remains a logical possibility and does not affect 
outcomes in the real world. Deliberative 
democrats have shown that this escape route is 
a plausible solution to the problem of vote 
manipulation. Given that sustainable and fair 
democracy is enhanced by del iberat ive 
procedures before vot ing ,  de l iberat ive 
democracy not only overcomes Riker’s criticism 
on manipulation, but can even save democracy 
from the problem of meaninglessness.
　　　　　　　　　　
［Notes］





 3	 It	 implies	 that	 an	alternative	which	has	 a	median	
peak	on	a	spectrum	wins	more	votes	 than	any	other	
alternatives	 because	 the	 median	 preference	 is	
supported	most	 by	both	voters	who	have	 left-	 and	
right-sided	preferences.
 4	 In	 line	with	Habermas,	 I	 argue	 that	 even	 crude	
opinions	and	religious	claims	can	be	articulated	 into	
generalizable	 interest	by	other	competent	participants,	
since	 informal	political	 sphere	 is	 sensitive	 to	problem	
statements,	and	articulates	them,	and	forms	them	into	
public	opinion	through	discourse	(Habermas	1996,	p.359).	
 5	 For	meta-level	 agreement	 over	 incommensurable	
values,	see	note	67	in	List	2003.
 6	 One	 may	 refute	 Riker,	 for	 future	 issues	 are	
unforeseeable.	Yet,	 the	 expectations	 of	 unspecified	
future	support	may	be	enough	for	participants	to	have	
an	incentive	to	cooperate	with	manipulators.
 7	 The 	 de l i bera t i on 	 proces s 	 may 	 sa t i s fy 	 the	
independence	 of	 irrelevant	 alternatives	 condition	
without	 imposing	voting	 rules	on	 it;	 thus,	 “positional	
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